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Abstract— Virtualization is critical to the infrastructure of 
cloud computing environment and other online services. 
Hypercall interface is provided by hypervisor in order to offer 
privileged requests by the guest domains. Attackers may use this 
interface to send malicious hypercalls. In the reported work, 
repetitive hypercall attacks and sending hypercalls within 
irregular sequences to Xen hypervisor were analyzed and finally 
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is proposed to detect these 
attacks. The proposed system is placed in the host domain 
(Dom0). Monitoring hypercalls traffic the system operates based 
on the identification of irregular behaviors in hypercalls sent 
from guest domains to hypervisor. Later on, the association rules 
algorithm is applied on the collected data within a fixed time 
window, a set of thresholds for maximum number of all types of 
the hypercalls is extracted. The results from the implementation 
of the proposed system show 91% true positive rate.  
 
Index Terms— Hypervisor security, Xen, Hypercall, 
Virtualization, Hypercall security 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N recent years, cloud computing has been increasingly 
grown as a flexible and cost-effective technology to provide 
business and application services on the Internet or wide 
private networks. The risk of using cloud computing is higher 
than other conventional methods. This is because part of client 
resources (such as storages and processors) are owned and 
operated by a third party and thus protecting its 
confidentiality, integrity, and privacy will be difficult since 
cloud computing uses a combination of different technologies 
such as Virtualization, Web 2.0 and so on  [1]. Therefore, it is 
natural to have vulnerabilities of these technologies inherited 
by the cloud computing. Virtualization is the most important 
technology used in cloud computing network infrastructures. 
As a result, many threats and attacks in the field of cloud 
computing are related to this technology. Threats in the field 
of virtualization are very wide and diverse. Hypervisor is one 
 
M.Mostafavi is with the Iran University of Science and Technology 
(IUST), Tehran, 1684613114, Iran (email: mjt.mostafavi@gmail.com) 
P.Kabiri is with the School of Computer Engineering, Iran University of 
Science and Technology (IUST), Tehran, 1684613114, Iran (email: 
peyman.kabiri@iust.ac.ir) 
 
of the most valuable targets for hackers in the cloud 
computing. This is due to the fact that if the attacker takes the 
control over a hypervisor on a server, then he can access rest 
of all the Virtual Machines (VMs) on that server. Hypervisor 
i.e. Virtual Machine Manager (VMM), attacks can be 
generally categorized into two types: attacks from host OS to 
hypervisor and attacks from guest VMs to hypervisor. The 
reported work is intended to detect attacks from guest VMs to 
Xen hypervisor  [2]. 
Xen is a well-known open source hypervisor widely used in 
cloud environments. The logic used in the Xen architecture is 
not complicated. Xen uses a privileged kernel to manage, 
monitor and control all guest VMs on a hardware server. This 
privileged kernel is called domain0 (or dom0) and all other 
domains managed by dom0 are known as guest domains (or 
unprivileged domains)  [3]. Once the hypervisor is conquered, 
the attacker can either control VMs by accessing them or can 
force them to fail. In other words, Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks can be successfully implemented in Dom0. In recent 
years, researches on the security of Xen VMs revealed that the 
virtual interfaces are vulnerable to different types of 
attacks  [4] [5]. Various researches and strategies are proposed 
for the security of VMs, among which, Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS), attack tracking, workload isolation and 
monitoring system are some examples. In this study, 
monitoring the hypercalls sent from VMs to the hypervisor is 
used to implement and detect a number of attacks on the Xen 
hypervisor, including repetitive hypercall attacks and irregular 
sequences in hypercall generation. Consuming hypervisor 
resources, these attacks often reduce the system performance. 
In other words, they are considered as a DoS attack. The 
proposed detection methods presented in this paper are a 
combination of signature-based methods and identification of 
anomalous hypercall sequences. Therefore, the proposed 
method can detect a variety of attacks. Efforts have been made 
to adapt search and sequence identification methods with the 
least overhead for making the proposed method applicable to 
large cloud computing networks.  
In the second section of this paper the reported work is 
introduced and its significance is discussed. The third section 
explains the problem and classifies the existing hypercall 
attacks. The architecture of the proposed system is presented 
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in the fourth section. In fifth and sixth sections, the proposed 
methods to detect the irregular order and repetitive hypercall 
attacks are described, respectively. The seventh section is 
about the application of intrusion detection system in cloud 
computing environment. The eighth section talks about 
implementation of the attacks in the experimental environment 
and the experimental results. Conclusions and future works are 
presented in the final section. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In recent years, due to the high popularity and development 
of the cloud computing services throughout the world, many 
efforts have been made to increase security of the VMs. 
However, the domains available in virtual servers are still 
unreliable because of several reasons, including unawareness 
of developers about all existing threats and invention of new 
attack methods. Since Dom0 of hypervisor is a high-value 
target, it is targeted in many attacks. In general, cloud 
computing security can be considered from different aspects. 
For example, Chonka et al.  [6] investigated DoS attacks based 
on XML and HTTP, and proposed a way to deal with these 
attacks. In another work Bacon et al.  [7] proposed a solution 
for information flow control specifically in Platform-as-a-
Service (PaaS) cloud services. Patel et al.  [8] examined 
challenges of using Intrusion Detection and Prevention System 
(IDPS) in cloud computing environments. Hashizume et 
al.  [1], studied cloud computing security from different 
aspects and classified vulnerabilities and threats in cloud 
environment. The work reported in the current text is aimed on 
the security of Xen virtualization infrastructures in cloud 
environment. In their reported work specifically considered 
hypercall attacks in Xen hypervisor and proposed a solution to 
handle certain types of these kind of attacks. In some of the 
earlier solutions recommended for hypervisor security, e.g.  [9] 
and  [10], intension was to reduce domains vulnerability by 
using the hypervisor to monitor them. But one cannot 
overcome all the threats using these methods, and some new 
exploits may be discovered that above approaches cannot 
prevent. In another reported work, Zhang et al.  [11], assumed 
that Dom0 might be converted into a destructive domain. 
Since Dom0 has access to other domains, guest domains must 
be protected against this domain. They have proposed a 
mechanism called CloudVisor which is a small security 
monitoring system to protect these sources. Difficulty in 
commercialization is one of the most important challenges in 
this case. This problem is due to the fact that they need to 
apply changes on the existing virtualization architectures. 
Therefore, it will make their implementation difficult and may 
create problems for future hypervisor updates. Colp et al.  [12], 
suggest a solution called Xoar that divides management 
domain into single-purpose components to reduce the 
likelihood of attackers’ success in capturing hypervisor. 
Hoang in his thesis  [13] proposed two different approaches to 
increase hypervisor security and to encounter hypercall 
attacks. The first strategy is authentication of hypercalls 
received by hypervisor using a MAC method and the other 
strategy is to implement a hypercall access table. Given the 
restrictions on the number of variables can be sent to 
hypervisor by a hypercall, it is not practically possible to use 
MAC method for the authentication of the hypercall. 
Implementation of access table has its own difficulties. The 
most important problem is access table volume that is 
proportionate to number of domains in virtual server. This is 
in contrast with the principle of Xen machines design concept. 
Jingzheng et al.  [14] proposed a mechanism called XenPump 
that prevents time channel attacks. As the greatest problem of 
their proposed method, it will significantly reduce system 
efficiency and creates excessive lag in hypervisor 
performance. Bharadwaja et al.  [15] designed and proposed an 
IDS called Collabra which works based on the detection of 
irregular behaviors in order to deal with hypercall threats. The 
proposed system allocates an anomaly score to every hypercall 
and if the score is above a specified threshold, the hypercall is 
considered anomalous and otherwise a normal hypercall. In 
another reported work, Wang et al.  [16] proposed a new 
approach to make hypercall interface useless to the attackers. 
In their proposed method, legal hypercalls are first encrypted 
in the guest operating system using RC4 encryption algorithm 
and then sent to the hypervisor. Another plugin located in the 
hypervisor decrypts all incoming hypercalls and then delivers 
them to the hypervisor. Thus, if incoming hypercalls are not 
previously encrypted by the same key, they will be converted 
into unclear words, and consequently they cannot be processed 
by the hypervisor. This approach is costly and affects the 
performance of the system since it requires performing 
Encryption/Decryption operations repeatedly. In  [17] an 
architecture was developed that split Dom0 privileges into two 
parts: First operations that can violate users privacy, removes 
to a per user management domain that called DomU 
Manage_VM. Other privileges was remain and form Thin 
Dom0. So in the event of a successful attack to DomU, only 
can compromise users in that DomU and no spread to other 
DomU. Also once Dom0 was compromised then attacker can’t 
access to private information of DomU. But they do not 
address DDoS attacks in their work. In another work  [18] they 
design a secure execution environment to ensure the 
confidentiality and integrity of guest virtual machine that 
running on untrusted management virtual machine. They 
categorized hypercalls that are used for management of DomU 
into three groups: 1. Hypercalls that are harmful to the privacy 
and integrity of DomU but not necessary, so should be 
prohibited. 2. Hypercalls hat are not harmful to the privacy 
and integrity, these hypercalls be unmodified. 3. Hypercalls 
that are harmful but necessary for management of DomU, so 
should be used with some restrictions. The proposed 
architecture use encryption and hash functions to protect 
integrity and privacy of virtual machine memory and vCPU. 
Milenkoski et al.  [19] proposed a hypercall attack simulator 
software installed on a guest VM that can execute various 
hypercall attacks. Using this software, one can evaluate 
performance and efficiency of the IDS. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
Hypervisor is an attractive target for hackers and attackers. 
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Therefore, they constantly try to find new ways to attack 
hypervisors. Attacks may have different effects on the target 
system, such as preventing hypervisor operation, which can be 
considered a state of crash for the hypervisor or its clients. In 
fact, these attacks are in the category of DoS attacks. Some 
other hypercall attacks may disrupt the hypervisor state in 
such a way that the targeted hypervisor may not be crashed; 
instead it may be exposed to conditions desired for attacker. 
For instance, if the victim hypervisor’s memory is in a certain 
pathway, then it might allow the attacker to implement a 
destructive code or high-level access operation. Hypercall 
attack may even cause access to the unauthorized information. 
For example, reading data from a portion of memory that is 
allocated to the hypervisor or some other guest VM. In rare 
cases, it is possible for the attacker to penetrate the system 
executing a specific hypercall (by executing a destructive code 
using hypercalls). A real example of this type of attack is the 
reported incident CVE 2017-8903  [20]. Hypercall attacks can 
generally be classified as follows  [21]: 
Running a single hypercall: 
Executing a hypercall with an ordinary parameter (a 
perfectly legal hypercall) 
Executing a hypercall with modified parameter(s) to exploit 
an available vulnerability. 
Running series of hypercalls with a specific order: 
Repetitive implementation of a specific hypercall. 
Repetitive implementation of several consecutive 
hypercalls. 
The second group of attacks, namely running a series of 
hypercalls, is also considered in this research. Anomaly 
detection methods are used to deal with these types of attacks. 
In recent years a variety of these attacks have been reported, 
for example, reported incidences such as CVE-2013-
4494  [22], CVE-2013-1920  [23] worth mentioning. In 
reported work by Shropshire  [24] he run successful CPU DoS 
attack from a malicious guest to hypervisor with a simple 
infinite loop that invoke hypercall 13. As a result malicious 
guest consumes 100% of CPU processing cycles. In  [25] most 
of this vulnerabilities and also some others, was exploited 
using hInjector to evaluate IDSes in virtual environment. 
In contrast to the approaches proposed by other researchers, 
the method proposed in this paper maintains the main concept 
of Xen hypervisor design  [26] and applies the lowest possible 
changes into the system. Another important point here is that 
guest operating systems remain unchanged. According to the 
above, the proposed method causes no problems in updating 
either Xen hypervisor or guest operating systems. 
There is a plugin in the solution proposed in this research 
located at Dom0 kernel responsible for monitoring all 
hypercalls sent by the guest VM. Once transformed into a 
suitable format, data generated by this plugin is sent to the 
IDS installed in the Dom0. The IDS learns rules and 
thresholds that exist in normal traffic as for their signature. 
Later on, this signature is used to identify any anomalous 
behavior within the received hypercall traffic.” 
IV. ARCHITECTURE  
Hypercalls can be monitored in different ways and this 
monitoring can be performed in different parts of the Xen 
virtualization system. In this study, as presented in Fig.1, 
monitoring all the hypercalls is performed within Dom0 
kernel. Monitoring hypercalls in Dom0 provides high 
efficiency, and low overhead. 
As depicted in Fig.1, all hypercalls sent from guest VMs to 
hypervisor are monitored in Dom0 using Xentrace plugin and 
stored in a storage area. Later on, stored data is converted to 
ASCII format using Xenalyze Plugin and finally it is send to 
IDS.  
In the reported work, Xentrace and Xenalyze plugins  [27] 
are used to monitor hypercalls in Dom0 kernel. These plugins 
are open-source and their coupled operation is needed for the 
hypercall monitoring. 
Xen hypervisor has various features helping developers to 
capture events occurring within the hypervisor. Tracing the 
data, Xen stores them in special buffers and then Xentrace 
plugin, which has been installed and activated in Dom0, can 
read data from the buffers periodically and store them on hard 
disk for further use. Xentrace plugin is a part of Xen 
hypervisor project associated with each of its distribution. This 
tool is fairly simple, yet very useful and practical. Information 
stored by Xentrace is unreadable to humans and thus a tool is 
needed to convert it’s data into a format that is readable for 
humans  [27]. Xenalyze plugin is used to convert the data 
stored by Xentrace to the ASCII format which is usable by 
IDS. A sample of Xenalyze output that is converted to ASCII 
format is presented in Fig.2. 
 
Fig. 1.  Monitoring hypercalls sent to Xen hypervisor. 
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Prior to the process carried-out by IDS, the captured data is 
preprocessed to filter excess items from the hypercalls. Any 
expression other than the hypercall’s hexadecimal number is 
considered as an excess item. For example, pre-processed 
information is presented in Fig.3. Function of IDS is explained 
in sections 5 and 6. 
A. DETECTION OF SEND SEQUENCE OF HYPERCALLS 
WITH IRREGULAR ORDER 
Hypercalls with irregular order do not have any typical 
appearances. Therefore, an intelligent method is needed to 
detect irregular sequences. The approach used in this study 
identifies anomalous sequences using apriori algorithm. Based 
on apriori algorithm, if {a,b,c} is a frequent itemset, then all of 
its subsets ({a,b}, {a,c}, {b,c}, {a}, {b}, {c}) be frequent  [29]. 
In this paper frequent itemsets (hypercall sequences) and 
accordingly frequent rules are identified using apriori 
algorithm and then extract rules from them. 
The first step in this procedure is to monitor and collect the 
hypercall traffic sent by VMs in an experimental environment 
within a relatively long period of time. It has been assumed 
that there were no attacks during this period. Hence one can 
call this traffic a white traffic. White traffic is used to train 
normal behavior of the environment to the IDS. Properties and 
behavior of the white traffic is assessed in two steps as 
described in the following sections. 
1) The first step of hypercall traffic analysis 
This analysis aims to identify abnormal hypercall sequences 
sent out by a VM in a Xen environment. Traffic analysis is 
very simple at this stage. Various hypercalls sent by all types 
of guest VMs in white traffic are tagged and stored in a table 
as normal hypercalls. Thereafter, whenever the IDS detects 
any hypercalls other than the values in this table, it will send a 
warning message to the system administrator. Two types of 
sabotage can be identified using this method. Type one is 
sending abnormal hypercalls undefined to Xen hypervisor that 
may aim to put the system in an undefined state. Type two is 
detection of legal hypercalls in the desired environment that 
are not regularly present in normal operating conditions and 
are assumed suspicious once detected. Table I provides 
samples of normal hypercalls. 
2) The second step of hypercall traffic analysis 
Purpose of the hypercall traffic analysis is to identify 
attacks executed by sending several consecutive hypercalls 
with irregular order. Since detection of repetitive hypercall 
DoS attacks of a particular type (such as “d d d d d” sequence) 
is performed by another approach explained in the section 6, 
only non-repetitive orders are considered in this section. 
Therefore, a simple program is developed to receive the 
hypercall traffic as for input and stores all available non-
repetitive orders in a file as for output. The output file of this 
program is input to the Weka software  [30] that is used to run 
apriori algorithm and to easily produce the output with a 
suitable format. Due to a variety of monitored unique 
hypercall values, the basket length is specified dynamically 
based on the number of non-repetitive hypercalls sequences 
and each non-repetitive sequence is placed in a separate 
basket. The empty space of the basket is denoted by “?” and 
all the values of basket are separated by comma, which is in 
the standard format of Weka software. An example for 
hypercall traffic (on the top of the figure) conversion into the 
suitable input format for the Weka software (at the bottom of 
the figure) is presented in Fig.4. In the reported work, it is 
assumed that there are at the most 8 hybercalls in each line, 
indicating that in sampled file only 8 types of different 
hypercalls are transmitted to hypervisor. Thus, no line can be 
permutated with unique value patterns larger than 8. 
Executing the program, the whole white traffic is segregated 
into numerous similar sequences and stored in an output file. 
Using Weka software and apriori algorithm, popular 
sequences in the traffic are identified. The repetitiveness of the 
sequences displayed by the apriori algorithm is determined by 
minimum support variable. Given the high variety nature of 
hypercalls traffic, the highest value for minimum support 
variable can be set to 0.5. In other words, often we can’t find a 
hypercall sequence that has a support value greater than 0.5. 
 
Fig. 2.  A sample of converted Xenalyze output. 
 
TABLE I 
SOME SAMPLES OF NORMAL HYPERCALLS IN THE XEN 
ENVIRONMENT. 
21 18 e 
11 a 1d 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Converting hypercall traffic to suitable input format for the Weka 
software. 
 
Fig. 3.  A sample pre-processed information by the data obtained from 
Xenalyze plugin. 
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Examples of popular sequences obtained from apriori 
algorithm using Weka software running on a sampled traffic 
are presented in Fig.5. 
In Fig.5, the number at the end of each ‘hypercall’ word 
indicates that hypercall permutation in the basket. For 
example, hypercall2 indicates the second permutation in the 
basket. Reader should be reminded that each basket had 8 
permutations. A number at the end of each line represents the 
number of occurrences of a given sequence in all the baskets. 
For example, the first set in Fig.5 has a population for 12,648 
occurrences. In the final step, these repetitive items are 
considered as the determinant of traffic’s normal behavior and 
stored as a signature. The IDS will use these signatures to 
separate normal and anomalous behaviors of the hypercall 
traffic within fixed time windows. Fig.6 shows the format of 
several sample signatures with different sequence lengths and 
how they are stored in the table. 
The IDS records the traffic of hypercalls within fixed time 
windows and compares various hypercalls against items stored 
in normal hypercall table. An alert is generated once any 
unusual hypercall type is detected. In the next step, traffic is 
segregated into non-repetitive pieces and all the pieces are 
compared versus the signatures of normal traffic stored in a 
separate table that was generated during the training stage. If 
no match is found, the sequence will be identified as an 
anomalous sequence. Boyer-Moore algorithm  [31] was used in 
this study as for the search algorithm.  
B. DETECTION OF REPETITIVE OCCURRENCES OF 
SIMILAR HYPERCALLS ATTACKS 
In this type of attacks, the attacker sends a large number of 
a certain type of hypercall (i.e. type 20) to the hypervisor and 
consumes hardware resources (CPU & memory). To detect 
this type of attacks as it was mentioned earlier, in this research 
IDS counts the number of occurrences of each type of 
hypercalls for a specified long period of time. This operation 
is performed within constant intervals to identify attacks and 
then considers the highest count of the each hypercall within a 
period of time as a threshold of that hypercall type occurrence 
in each time interval. Obtained thresholds are stored in a table 
such as Table II. 
 
Determining the thresholds, entire traffic of the hypercalls 
within specified time windows are analyzed. Alerts will be 
generated once number of occurrences passes a predefined 
threshold. 
C. APPLICATION OF IDS IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
ENVIRONMENT 
As shown in Fig.7, the cloud computing infrastructure 
consists of many virtual hypervisors installed on different 
hardware servers  [32]. In previous sections, the proposed 
approach for IDS was to install it on Dom0 of a number of 
servers to make it operate independently. One of the 
advantages of this approach is its low traffic overhead for each 
IDS. On the other hand, since every server may be assigned to 
a customer with certain needs, any one of the IDSs can be 
configured differently based on requirement of the servers 
they are installed on. Thus, one can expect that the number of 
false positive and false negative alerts to reduce. 
Another advantage of having independent IDSs on each 
hypervisor is that the traffic monitored by each IDS will be 
limited. Thus, speed and performance of the detection is 
increased. 
V. EVALUATION RESULTS 
In this section, results of the experiments and evaluation of 
the proposed IDS method is discussed using two scenarios. In 
the first scenario hypervisor is attacked by sending various 
hypercalls with irregular order. Second scenario is another 
type of attack on the hypervisor that is carried-out by sending 
repetitive hypercalls to the hypervisor. 
A. The first scenario – sending various consecutive 
hypercalls with irregular order 
 
Fig. 7.  Hypervisors in the cloud computing environment. 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Some examples of apriori algorithm output. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  A few signature examples of normal traffic. 
 
TABLE II 
SAMPLE TABLE FOR HYPERCALLS OCCURRENCE THRESHOLDS. 
Number of Hypercalls Occurrence threshold 
a 82 
e 247 
1a 36 
1d 184 
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In this scenario, as displayed in Fig.8, Xen hypervisor 
serves 5 virtual guest machines on a server with core i5 CPU 
and 4GB RAM. Each VM offers a different service to the 
users. One of these guest machines that is controlled by the 
attacker (one that is highlighted with a darker color), starts 
sending consecutive hypercalls with irregular order to disrupt 
Xen hypervisor operation or to reduce its performance. These 
attacks can lead to DoS as the order of hypercalls is out of the 
ordinary and not in a way hypervisor is expecting. This in turn 
causes hypervisor to encounter an unusual situation and to be 
unable to continue to serve its VMs. Hypercalls also may be 
sent with seemingly legitimate order, but in fact they are 
sending requests to the hypervisor that cause conflict and 
waste of resources. In the attack simulated in this research, 
VM number 2 starts sending several hypercalls with irregular 
order and IDS located in Dom0 must detect these attacks and 
generate alerts. Given that these attacks use special order of 
hypercalls, hypercall parameters are not important in this 
scenario. As mentioned in section 3, two examples of these 
attacks are reported as CVE-2013-4494  [22] and CVE-2013-
1920  [23]. 
1) Scenario implemented in the experiments and the results 
An experiment that was conducted to implement this 
scenario and to evaluate performance of the IDS can be 
described in the following steps: 
First step: Traffic of the hypercalls are monitored for 10 
hours and saved in a file. Over eighteen million and five 
hundred thousand hypercalls were generated during this time 
which seems to be sufficient for analyzing the hypercall traffic 
behavior in normal conditions. 
The recorded file that contains broken traffic data is fed into 
Weka software in order to implement apriori algorithm on its 
data. In the output of Weka, number of repetitive items with 
minimum support values of 0.5 and 0.3 is very limited. This 
result was expected and it is justifiable due to the wide variety 
of the hypercall sequences in the recorded hypercall traffic 
behavior. Therefore, the best way to cover diversity of the 
hypercalls traffic behavior is to use several different sets with 
lower support coefficients. According to the experiments, 
normal traffic behavior of hypercalls can be often separated 
with only 20 signatures from abnormal behavior with an 
acceptable accuracy (over 98%). In this study, a set of 
signatures with minimum support of 0.1 were used to extract 
the signatures. Signatures extracted from the output of apriori 
algorithm are reported in Table III. 
Second step: The traffic related to the hypercalls generated 
within 10 windows of 10-seconds time interval was monitored 
in normal operating conditions and saved in a file. Later on, as 
for testing, different types of hypercalls that are recorded in 
these files are extracted and compared versus normal 
hypercalls in the table and no warning messages are generated. 
This traffic was analyzed using normal traffic signatures 
obtained in the 5th step. False positive rate is 0.76%. Here 
false positive rate represents wrong detections of a part of 
normal traffic as anomaly traffic. 
Third step: As presented in Table IV, at random times in a 
10 seconds time interval window, VM2 sends 11 irregular 
hypercall sequences to the hypervisor. As shown in Fig.9, the 
IDS issued 5 warning messages for anomalous hypercalls. The 
type of anomalous hypercall found at each message is 
displayed by the bracket signs “[ ]”. Later on, these samples 
are analyzed using signatures that were obtained in step 1 and 
consequently total number of 17 warning messages were 
issued. 7 alerts out of 17 are false warnings generated before 
inserting the attacks (related to the 0.76% false positive rate 
for the reported approach). 
TABLE III 
SIGNATURES EXTRACTED FROM THE OUTPUT OF APRIORI 
ALGORITHM IN EXPERIMENT. 
Nom. Signature Nom. Signature 
1 a , 1a 12 18, 1d, 21, 20 
2 1a, d 13 18, 1d, 1a 
3 d, 1a 14 18, 1d, d 
4 d, 14 15 18, 1d, 21 
5 18, 1d 16 d, 18, 1d 
6 18, d 17 d, 24, 1a 
7 1, 1a 18 14, 20 
8 d, 18 19 20, 18 
9 1d, 1a 20 18, 20 
10 1d, d 21 24, 1a 
11 d, 11   
 
 
Fig. 8.  Consecutive hypercall attacks with irregular orders. 
 
Fig. 9.  Warning messages from anomaly hypercalls within 10 seconds time 
interval window after execution of the attacks. 
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The irregular sequence 4 in Table IV (24, a, 14, 21, 19, 1a, 
1) was not identified. Studying the cause, the recorded 
hypercall traffic was examined. This sequence is combined 
with its previous sequence (d, 1a, 24, a, 14, 21, 19) after being 
added to the initial traffic, and a new sequence is generated 
that matches with one of the signatures (d, 1a) given in Table 
III. Numbers of false and true warning messages are given in 
Table V. 
Using the resulted values, (1) to (5) are used to calculate 
error rates for the method proposed in this study. 
True Positive Rate (TPR): 
)/( FNTPTPTPR +=  (1) 
Where TP is the number of true positive alerts and FN is the 
number of false negative alerts. 
False Positive Rate (FPR): 
TN)+FP/(FP=FPR  (2) 
Where FP is the number of false positive alerts issued and 
TN is the number of true negative alerts. 
True Negative Rate (TNR) or Specificity (SPC): 
TN)+TN/(FP=SPCor  TNR  (3) 
Where TN is the number of true negative alerts and FP is 
the number of false positive alerts. 
Negative Predictive Value (NPV): 
FN)+TN/(TN=NPV  (4) 
Where TN is the number of true negative alerts and FN is 
the number of false negative alerts. 
F1 Score: 
FN)+FP+2TP/(2TP1F =  (5) 
Where TP is the number of true positive alerts, FP is the 
number of false positive alerts and FN is the number of false 
negative alerts. Results are reported in Table VI. 
B. The second scenario – Repetitive hypercalls 
This scenario is implemented in an experimental 
environment similar to scenario 1, but this time the guest VM 
executes 2 attacks by sending a large number of hypercall 21 
(physdev_op). The purpose of this attack is to consume or 
waste hypervisor resources by sending a large number of 
repetitive hypercalls. Therefore, hypervisor has to process all 
the incoming hypercalls that will lead to the waste of 
processor resources. Two examples of these attacks are 
reported as CVE-2015-7969  [33] and CVE-2015-7971  [34]. 
These attacks also have been referred to in various articles 
e.g.  [19]. 
1) Scenario implemented in the experiment and its results 
This experiment is aimed on implementing a scenario to 
evaluate performance of the proposed IDS and can be 
described in the following steps: 
First step: The traffic of hypercalls sent to hypervisor is 
monitored for ten hours. Later on, number of incoming 
hypercalls for each hypercall is counted within 5-seconds time 
interval windows and finally the count is stored in a table. A 
part of the table related to physdev_op hypercall is presented 
in Table VII. 
Second Step: Evaluating the performance of IDS, hypercall 
21 was sent 100, 85, 70, 60 and 50 times for 5 times at random 
intervals, respectively, where the IDS detected the attacks in 4 
of 5 cases. Only one attack was not identified. In the 4th 
attack, 60 hypercalls of type 21were sent out. In fact, total 
number of both malicious and legitimate hypercalls (the 
equivalent of 68 hypercalls) was lower than the threshold, i.e. 
74. Thus, no alert is generated. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Hypervisors in cloud computing environment are attractive 
targets for attackers and this is why their protection against 
security threats is very important. One of the common 
methods used to attack hypervisors is to use hypercall 
interface to send malicious hypercalls by guest VMs. The 
reported work investigated repetitive hypercall attacks and 
attacks carried-out by sending hypercalls with irregular order. 
In the reported work, hypercalls traffic in Dom0 is monitored. 
Executing a series of preprocesses, monitored traffic was 
broken into several non-repetitive rules. Apriori algorithm was 
applied to the resulted rule set. Number of repetitive 
hypercalls in each sequence defined is set to predefined 
TABLE IV 
A SAMPLED IRREGULAR SEQUENCES SENT TO XEN HYPERVISOR. 
No. Irregular hypercalls sent to hypervisor by attacker 
1 18, ,21, 1, d,18,18,18 
2 22, d, 12 
3 d, 21, 25, 11 
4 24, a, 14, 21, 19, 1a, 1 
5 1, 1d, 24, d 
6 d, 21, 1d, 24, 18 
7 1b 
8 14, 1a, 21, a, 18 
9 21, 18, 1a 
10 14, 23, 23, 23, 23, 23 
11 1d, 21, 24, 18 
 
 
TABLE VII 
NUMBER OF INCOMING PHYSDEV_OP HYPERCALLS WITHIN 5-SECONDS 
TIME INTERVAL WINDOWS. 
Time Hypercall type Received count 
[0-5] 21 29 
[5-10] 21 6 
[10-15] 21 7 
[15-20] 21 29 
[20-25] 21 7 
[25-30] 21 11 
 
TABLE V 
CLASSIFICATION OF POSITIVE WARNING MESSAGES. 
Alarm condition Number of alerts 
True Positive  10 
False Positive  0 
True Negative  915  
False Negative 1 
 
TABLE VI 
THE REPORTED RESULTS. 
Alarm condition Number of alerts 
True Positive Rate (TPR) 91% 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0% 
True Negative Rate (TNR) 100% 
Negative Predictive Value 99.8% 
F1 Score 95% 
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thresholds. In the last step, results are used to extract 
signatures of regular hypercalls behavior. Finally, the 
proposed IDS can detect irregular hypercall behaviors using 
these signatures. 
The proposed method used in this paper searches for the 
signatures obtained from normal traffic for the exact match 
within a given traffic. A suggestion for future research is to 
use an algorithm that can match signatures using similarity 
threshold between existing signatures and different parts of 
hypercall traffic. If the similarity of each part of the traffic 
with existing signatures is more than the threshold, it would be 
considered as regular hypercall traffic; otherwise, it is an 
anomalous traffic. Using this method, it is expected to have a 
reduced false positive rate. 
On the other hand, the approach reported in this paper only 
considers order of hypercalls and number of their repetitive 
generations. Another proposal to improve this approach is to 
the sent hypercalls parameters in addition to their order and 
number of repetitions to detect anomalies. Thus, it can be 
expected to have the proposed IDS covering more types of 
attacks. 
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